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INTRODUCTION
Japan has a very peculiar place in the framework of 
comparative law in general. It is often praised as a case of 
successful ground for legal transplants, as it was able to adopt 
and adapt Western (whatever that means) legal models in a 
Confucian (again, whatever that means) country. On the other 
hand, its depiction is more than occasionally stereotypical, based 
on old and surpassed scholarship which over-emphasizes 
Japanese “cultural uniqueness.” The general picture of Japan in 
comparative law scholarship has been defined as 
“schizophrenic.”1 Of course there are many reasons behind this 
J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law, Nagoya University. I am deeply 
grateful to all my colleagues who helped me write this paper and in particular 
to my colleagues at Nagoya University Graduate School of Law: Frank 
Bennett, Isabelle Giraudou, David Green, Hiroko Ito and Sean McGinty. I am 
also indebted to Colin Jones at Doshisha University, Fabiana Marinaro at 
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situation, and in this paper I will try to explain why Japan has 
been, and still is, a “victim” of comparative law.
The starting point of this analysis is one of the most widely 
accepted and well-known descriptions of the relationship 
between law and society in Japan, a picture that everybody even 
slightly familiar with Japanese law studies will immediately 
recognize. In 1976, an extremely influential book stated with no 
hesitations that “Japanese do not like law,”2 especially when it 
came to dispute resolution. Law, the author explained, is 
something external to Japanese social order and therefore, 
notwithstanding the significant imitation of Western legal 
models, the underlying traditional, social norms prevailed. Hence 
this bold statement was made.
Although this passage is well-known, fewer scholars know 
that the book was originally published in France ten years 
earlier 3 and even fewer ventured to read the preface to the 
English edition, where the author plainly admits: 
I have said that the Japanese do not like to have recourse to 
litigation as a means of dispute resolution. But after the 
publication of the French edition, there have been many social 
events which seem to indicate that in this respect a remarkable 
change may be taking place in the Japanese mentality. Almost 
every day the newspapers are full of reports about actions 
brought to the courts claiming damages for loss caused by 
public nuisances of all sorts, motorcar accidents, etc. Under 
such circumstances, is it legitimate for us to leave intact the 
descriptions given in Chapter 9? The best way of course 
would have been to drastically modify this section, if possible. 
But such a modification would exceed the limits of our present 
scheme, and furthermore it is prudent not to pass hasty 
Manchester University and Andrea Ortolani at Hitotsubashi University for their 
precious advice on the draft.
1 Andrea Ortolani, Il giri e la questione della mentalità giuridica giapponese, 3 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 371, 381 (2009) (It.).
2. YOSHIUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAw 160 (Anthony 
H. Angelo ed., trans. 1976) (1966).
3. Jacques Robert, Les Japonais et le pouvoir, in INTRODUCTION AU 
DROIT JAPONAIS (vol. XIX 1966) (Fr.).
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judgement on so sudden a change in the mental aspect of a 
nation. . . . Without exaggeration we can say that we are now 
indeed seeing a rush for litigation.4
So why did the easy and somewhat stereotypical depiction 
make its way into most comparative law books while the more 
subtle, complex and critical remark in the introduction is known 
only to a limited number of scholars in Japanese law?
I. JAPANESE LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW: THE ORIGINS 
OF THE PROBLEM
The remark above leads us to a first preliminary reflection. In 
comparative law studies it is very uncommon for a researcher to 
have an “average” knowledge of Japanese law. Usually there is a 
great divide between a handful of individuals with a broad 
expertise in the field for whom Japanese law is their main (or at 
least one of their main) research interest and the rest of the 
world, composed of scholars who have limited (usually during 
undergraduate studies in comparative law) or no exposure to the 
legal system of Japan. Only very rarely does a scholar of 
Japanese law venture into writing about general comparative law 
problems5; on the other hand, quite often scholars of comparative 
law theory (whether methodology, epistemology, systemic 
studies, legal families, etc.) touch, albeit incidentally, upon 
Japanese law topics. The results are, of course, highly influenced 
by the lack of specific preparation on the subject, so it may
happen that otherwise wonderful scholars become shallow (or at 
least naïve) when it comes to Japan. Scholars of Japanese law 
and general comparative lawyers do not communicate as 
intensely as would be necessary for healthy cross contamination; 
and so, the special knowledge about Japan is kept among a 
4. Noda, supra note 2, at xii.
5. Frank Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal Studies in American 
Comparative Law, UTAH L. REV. 639, 639 (1997).
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restricted group of people, often perceived from the outside to be 
as quirky as “a club of collectors of poisonous mushrooms.”6
A second preliminary reflection is that the approach to 
Japanese law is heavily influenced by higher education, and so a 
second great divide appears that could roughly be represented 
through a juxtaposition of the “Continental European” model and 
the “Common Law” approach. In (continental) Europe, law 
studies are traditionally conducted at the undergraduate level and 
there is virtually no possibility of receiving a “mixed” university 
education (for example, an undergraduate degree in Japanese 
studies and a master’s degree in law). Although the Bologna 
Process7 is shaping the higher education in a form resembling the 
Anglo-Saxon approach (i.e. 3-years Bachelor and 2-years 
Master), most Continental European countries have rejected this 
approach in faculties that lead to a registered profession (like 
attorney-at-law, notary public, medical doctor, architect, etc.). In 
other words, students may be able to get a degree (whether 
undergraduate or graduate) in law and another one in a different 
subject, but unless they get both undergraduate and graduate 
education in law they will be unable to become judges, 
prosecutors or attorneys. Of course this makes a law degree 
much less enticing. Wrapping up with a brutal generalization, it 
is acceptable to say that most continental European jurists 
dealing with Japanese law therefore lack the deep preparation in 
Japanese studies that more flexible systems of higher education 
allow. On the other hand, though, European scholars generally 
possess a deeper knowledge of formal law.8
6. GABRIELE CRESPI REGHIZZI, DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E ARBITRATO IN 
CINA. TRA CONTINUITÀ E RIFORMA 1 (Renzo Cavalieri ed. 1991) (It.) (defining 
the attitude towards scholars of Chinese Law in the 1980s).
7. Welcome to the EHEA Official Website!, EUROPEAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION AREA, http://www.ehea.info (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (stating 
“[a]s the main objective of the Bologna Process since its inception in 1999, the 
EHEA was meant to ensure more comparable, compatible and coherent 
systems of higher education in Europe”).
8. See generally Luke Nottage, Japanisches Recht, Japanese Law, and 
Nihon-hô: Towards Transnational Collaboration in Research and Teaching, 12 
J. JAPANESE L. 17 (2001) (Ger.) 
2014] Japan as a Victim of Comparative Law 735
Irrespective of university training, however, it is also true that 
the Civil lawyer and the Common lawyer look to Japan through 
very different Kantian “blue lenses.” A lot of features of 
Japanese law perceived as “peculiar” by American (or Canadian 
or Australian) scholars are completely normal to somebody with 
a Continental European background. For instance, there is no 
notion of contempt in Japanese courts. The same may be said for 
courts in Italy. Appellate courts can review the merits of a 
dispute. So it is in Germany. There is no full discovery in civil 
litigation. So it is in France. It seems that, with very few 
exceptions, what has been highlighted as “Japanese” in the 
English-speaking word is not really Japanese, but mostly related 
to Common law or Civil law issues. Lack of knowledge among 
comparative law scholars, lack of communication between 
specialists of Japan, and the general community of comparative 
law and a study background that makes it difficult to have a deep 
understanding of Japanese law and society are the factual 
premises that led to the “victimization” of Japan in comparative 
law. This is not, however, the complete picture. 
Japan also suffers from an “unlucky setting” in the history of 
comparative law. Law is, as most human activities are, highly 
influenced by trends and fashions. Japan had its economic boom 
in the 1980s and early ‘90s, but even before that it was growing 
at a “Chinese” pace. The business community was looking at the 
country with a mix of fear and admiration, and books predicting 
the rise of Japan as the world’s leading country were written.9
This interest towards Japan, however, did not result in a 
corresponding interest in comparative law about Japan; language 
barriers, underdeveloped legal exchange and the widespread 
belief that the Japanese legal system was not so interesting after 
all (maybe in a purely “fox-and-the-grapes” fashion) because 
“Japanese do not like law” prevented the development of a 
structured scholarship on Japanese law in the framework of 
general comparative law. Specific legal knowledge about the 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=837024.
9. See generally EZRA VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR 
AMERICA (1979).
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country remained with those few who were willing and equipped 
to overcome these difficulties.
Compared with the present situation in the late booming 
country, i.e. the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the bad 
luck of Japan is extremely evident. It is enough to remember that 
in the 1980s there was no Internet to find laws or judgements, 
while now most Chinese laws and basically all the important 
decisions of the People’s Supreme Court of China are available 
in English (unofficial) translation. Even looking at the practical 
problems of doing fieldwork research in Japan, think about how 
expensive a flight was, say, from Paris to Tokyo in 1985 
compared to a flight from Paris to Beijing today, or how 
expensive it once was to make and receive international phone 
calls to and from Japan.
The lack of widespread interest towards Japanese law was not 
limited to academics, as the professional world (at least in 
Europe) was also stuck to the image of Japan as a far and 
unwelcoming place. And so, to use the Italian example, no less 
than five law firms have an office in China, plus many more 
have a “China desk.” No more than two have (or ever had) a 
Japan desk or an office in Japan.
Of course I am not maintaining that there were no 
developments in the study of Japanese law in recent years; to the 
contrary, a wide and structured scholarship developed in many 
countries, mainly in the United States, Canada, Australia10 and 
Germany. 11 What I would like to underline is that the 
development in Japanese law studies did not result in a 
significant increase of the importance of Japanese law in 
comparative law in general.
10. See THE AUSTRALIAN NETWORK FOR JAPANESE LAW,
http://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (detailing a scholarly 
initiate by Australian universities to help other better understand Japanese law).
11. See Journal of Japanese Law: Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht, 
GERMAN-JAPANESE ASS’N OF JURISTS, http://www.djjv.org/Englisch/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (providing access to the only law journal outside 
Japan entirely devoted to Japanese law).
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II. THE WEIGHT OF JAPANESE LAW IN GENERAL 
COMPARATIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
The attempt to give a “quantitative” measure of Japanese law 
in general comparative law studies was attempted by a leading 
scholar in the field. In 1997, in a landmark article about the 
relationships between comparative law and Japanese law12 (often 
quoted by comparative lawyers) Frank Upham did a useful 
exercise to weigh the relative importance of Japan in 
comparative law by counting the articles on Japan in a review he 
considered the most representative in the United States, the 
American Journal of Comparative Law. I moved from his effort 
and covered the years from 1997 to 2013. Also, I extended my 
analysis to another influential, English based, journal. The 
results were ambiguous and fascinating at the same time. 
In the American Journal of Comparative Law Japan ranked 
first, together with the People’s Republic of China, with 15 
entries in the relevant period. So, prima facie, Japanese law 
appears to be very interesting to comparative lawyers. However, 
in evaluating those results, it is necessary to highlight that more 
than half of those contributions (8 out of 15) were part of a 
special issue, titled “Law in Japan.”13 In the period between 1997 
– 2013 there was only one other special issue not devoted to a 
technical problem in law, 14 but to the legal system of a 
12. See generally Upham, supra note 5. It is often quoted because it is 
contained in a special issue of the Utah Law Review collecting papers 
presented in a conference involving mainly comparative lawyers rather than
country specialists.
13. See Kahei Rokumoto, Japanese Law Symposium: Law and Culture 
in Transition, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, n.4 (2001).
14. See Stephen B. Bubank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure 
Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 675 n.4 (1997); See also Nils Jansen & Ralf Michael, Beyond the 
State? Rethinking Private Law: Introduction to the Issue, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
527 n.3 (2008); See also Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in 
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family 
Law Exceptionalism—Introduction to the Special Issue on Comparative Family 
Law 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 n. 4 (2010); Samantha Besson, Evolutions in 
Antidiscrimination Law in Europe and North America: Evolutions in Non-
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population — the 1997, n. 2 (Spring) issue about a “Symposium 
on Gypsy Law.” This special issue is composed of eleven 
articles, which would put Romani law as the fourth most studied 
system in the period (the third being German law). I would 
hesitate, to say the least, to affirm that the law of the Gypsies is 
considered particularly important by mainstream comparative 
law scholarship. So the analysis leaves us with this doubt: is 
Japanese law often studied because it is a main subject in 
contemporary studies (as is probably the case with the PRC) or 
because it is still perceived as a bizarre object, deserving a 
special issue as a kind of “affirmative (scientific) action” 
towards a disadvantaged subject?
To gain another perspective from the other side of the 
Atlantic Ocean (but keeping inside the Common Law world), I 
did the same exercise on another representative journal of 
comparative law published in the United Kingdom, the 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, covering the 
period between 1952 and 2013. In this case, however, the 
analysis was made more complicated by the fact that, being a 
publication devoted to comparative and international law, many 
articles on Japan were not technically focusing on Japanese law, 
but instead dealt with some public international law issue 
involving the country. I therefore decided to exclude those 
articles. However, other scholars may have a different opinion 
and come to different results from the same exercise.
In the span of 51 years, there were only ten entries on Japan. 
Considering that the journal has a British perspective, it is no 
surprise that English speaking countries and (former and present) 
countries of the Commonwealth were given great attention. So it 
does not make very much sense to measure the relative weight of 
Japan by comparing it with countries like the United States (70 
entries), Australia (64), Canada (42) or India (36). Equally, it is 
probably not particularly interesting to compare Japan with some 
“juggernaut” countries in comparative law, like Germany (86, 
Discrimination Law within the ECHR and the ESC Systems: It Takes Two to 
Tango in the Council of Europe +DOI, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (Winter 2012).
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including East Germany) or France (76). Still, Japan has been 
given less attention than Israel (22), Sweden (15) and Poland 
(13). Japan is lagging behind the PRC (18), notwithstanding the 
fact that for many years during the Mao period (and especially 
during the years of “legal nihilism”) there was a widespread 
belief that it was just impossible to make legal research about 
China.15
I decided to expand my analysis and not to limit it to reviews. 
Therefore, I dealt with handbooks of comparative law, too. I 
particularly focused on Japan’s position in the systemic partition 
of the world into “legal families.”
Of course handbooks are not intended for research, but just 
for educational purposes and most comparative lawyers are well 
aware of the fact that the legal families theory is outdated, Euro-
centric, and probably kept alive to have a handy tool to easily 
teach students some history of comparative law. So, theoretically 
speaking, a handbook should not be used as a reference for 
research. True as it might be, those kinds of texts are of great 
importance in the academic education of researchers, especially 
when it comes to “exotic” legal systems. As I mentioned before, 
unless somebody decides to specialize in a country, the 
handbook of comparative law, encountered during their 
undergraduate studies, will be their only exposure to that system.
In order to select which texts to analyse I checked on the 
Internet the syllabi of about 50 comparative law courses taught 
in the USA and in Europe, and considered for these purposes 
only those texts which adopt a systemic or country-based 
approach.16 The results may appear narrow, as most instructors 
15. The pioneers of legal research on the PRC had very hard times 
finding materials. One of the first books on the subject, JEROME A. COHEN, THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–63: AN
INTRODUCTION (1968), was largely based on interviews to refugees in Hong 
Kong and newspaper articles, from which Cohen tried to develop a more 
structured and consistent picture.
16. My analysis does not take into account the most widely used 
textbook for comparative law courses. See generally UGO MATTEI, TEEMU 
RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT,
MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009).
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prefer to rely on a specifically designed set of materials rather 
than on institutional handbooks.
I selected the textbooks by David (and Jauffret-Spinosi), 17
Glendon-Carozza-Picker, 18 Glenn,19 and Zweigert and Kötz. 20
The approach of those texts towards Japan is interesting indeed.
David puts Japan in Part Four, under the heading “Other 
Conceptions of Law and the Social Order,” in Title III, “Law of 
Far East” (together with China). 
Glendon-Carozza-Picker decides not to deal with Japan and 
mentions the country three times, to inform readers that it has a 
civil code based on the German BGB, has a Parliament and that 
Japanese judges receive specific training. As for systemic issues, 
Japan is set within the Civil Law tradition. 
Glenn only marginally deals with Japan in the chapter 
devoted to the Confucian Legal Tradition, specifically under 
“Western Law in East Asia.”
When it comes to divide the world into “legal families,”
Zweigert and Kötz include Japan in the broad “Other” family 
(subsection “Law in the Far East,” together with China).
Glendon-Carozza-Picker and Glenn basically chose not to 
discuss Japan in detail. Although this is questionable, at least 
from a Japanese law scholar’s perspective, neither of those books 
presumes to be encyclopaedic. I am not in the position to judge 
whether Japan was excluded because the authors did not think it 
was important for their systemic analysis or because they felt 
unprepared to properly deal with the subject.
Generally speaking, in both David and Zweigert and Kötz, 
Japan is dealt with using a historical perspective, underlining the 
17. This book has been translated in several languages (English and 
Italian included) and is still widely used in European universities. See generally
RENÉ DAVID & CAMILLE JAUFFRÉT-SPINOSI, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT 
CONTEMPORAINS (11th ed. 2002) (Fr.).
18. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN 
B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2008).
19. See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE 
WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (4th ed. 2010).
20. See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998).
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three major influences on Japanese law by the Chinese Imperial 
(VI century), European (XIX century), and American (second 
half of the XX century) models. A feature of these handbooks is 
that they tend to compare “apples and oranges,” i.e. Japanese law 
in action with Western law in the books. I do not think that is 
necessarily wrong to spend words on the legal culture and the 
legal practice of a country (although I do believe that the 
sociologist of law and the legal anthropologist are far better 
equipped than the comparative lawyer to perform this task). 
What is striking is that this is limited to jurisdictions, like Japan, 
perceived to be somehow “exotic.” It would be fair to discuss the 
importance of giri in a chapter about Japanese law only if the 
author(s) would spend a similar effort to discuss, for example, 
the importance of corruption in Italy and its incidence on the 
legal system.
Another notable feature of those texts, and more evident as 
their first edition is quite old (David, 1965 and Zweigert and 
Kötz, 1977), is that the bibliography they refer to is often not 
recent. Both David and Zweigert and Kötz still heavily rely on 
“traditional” texts, like Noda and Kawashima.21 When it comes 
to update those textbooks, the curators seem to prefer a brushing 
up and some addenda rather than a comprehensive rewriting. 
This is understandable, given the purpose of the handbooks and 
the fact that it would be unfair to ask their curators to possess the 
knowledge to properly update chapters about some dozens of 
countries. Nevertheless, the result is somehow contradictory: a 
chapter on the Japanese legal system largely based on the 
importance of Confucian culture and emphasizing the reluctance 
towards litigation does not mix well with a conclusion that 
maybe those aspects were overemphasized and in reality things 
are (or may be) different. 22
21. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary 
Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (1963).
22. Also, it should not be underestimated that social sciences, maybe 
less openly than hard sciences, do evolve and some theories become outdated. 
While in the 1960’s the “cultural” theory about Japanese law was almost 
742 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
This whole debate, however, could even be irrelevant: as 
mentioned before, the legal theory is probably outdated. 23
Moreover, comparative law is now struggling with some huge 
epistemological (or even philosophical) problems 24 that are 
forcing scholars to rethink the conceptual framework under 
which comparative law research has been carried out until very 
recent times.
Another phenomenon that may be observed in comparative 
law is that the systemic or country-based approach is fading, 
leaving room to a comparison mostly based on very specific 
legal problems and institutions in various jurisdictions. To say it 
using the comparative law lexicon, micro-comparison is 
overcoming macro-comparison. 
Given these evolutions, should we still try to examine Japan 
under the lens of traditional comparative law, putting the country 
into some “legal family”? Does Japan qualify as a system of the 
“Far East” or should it be more appropriately set in the Civil 
Law tradition?25 Or should we read Japan as a “mixed” legal 
system?26
unchallenged, now only a restricted number of scholars among Japanese law 
experts still rely on that theoretical framework.
23. Zweigert, supra note 20 at 299 (warning readers that the “doctrine 
of legal families should not be taken so seriously”).
24. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging,
INT’L COMP. L. Q., 45, 1, 52, 80 (1996) (proposing a popular theory that legal 
systems are ultimately incomparable, because behind each country there is a 
cognitive cultural framework. According to this author, this is also the reason 
why legal systems are not converging, although it may appear otherwise).
25. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 7 (3d ed. 2011) (stating “[j]apanese 
law is part of the Romano-Germanic family of law, with some elements of US 
law”); see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ROGELIO PERÉZ PERDOMO, THE CIVIL 
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND 
LATIN AMERICA 4 (3d ed. 2007).
26. As is well-known, a mixed legal system is a system in which 
elements of continental civil law and Anglo-American common law co-exist. 
Examples can be found in Scotland, Israel, South Africa, Louisiana, Quebec. 
According to some scholars, Japan is also one of those systems. See Isabelle 
Giraudou, Le Japon: une «figure du droit comparé» in TRANSFERTS DES 
CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES EN DROIT PUBLIC , (Pierre Brunet & Hajime Yamamoto 
(eds.)); (2013) (Fr.); see NODA, supra note 4, at xii.
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While the natural answer would probably be at least critical, it 
seems that comparative lawyers, even when trying to approach 
new theories and/or methods for comparative law, still treat 
Japan the old way. Considering Japanese law unique, or even 
bizarre, and continuing to refer to the same sources (or derivate 
sources) that gave birth to the stereotype that “Japanese do not 
like law” is a path that Japan seems to have become dependent 
on.
It is very easy to find examples of this trend. 
In 1997, in an attempt to update and give fresh energy to the 
legal families’ approach, Ugo Mattei tried to elaborate a new 
partition, based on three “patterns” of law, namely 1) rule of 
professional law, 2) rule of political law and 3) rule of traditional 
law. 27 This new conceptual partition was meant to create a 
“dynamic non-Western-centric classification,” and part of its 
intellectual manifesto was the idea that “Western centrism 
cannot be the foundation of a classification of legal systems that 
aim to cover the whole world”28. Scholars of Japanese law would 
have been enthusiastic for such an approach, especially since 
Mattei expressly recognized that a new vision of legal families 
was solicited in part by the “increased importance and the 
extraordinary progress of Japanese law in the last thirty years.”29
This enthusiasm would have started to decline when Japanese 
law experts learned that Japan was again put together with China 
under the heading “Rule of Traditional Law: the Oriental View 
of the Law.” Being well aware that Japan (and Eastern Asia) in 
general had been a victim of stereotypes based on “legal 
orientalism,” 30 the author tackles the issue directly, affirming 
27. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the 
World’s Legal Systems, 45.1 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 10 (1997). (explaining the 
original version of such theoretical taxonomy, although the approach to this 
paper was widely commented, rethought and even amended by Mattei himself).
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Veronica Taylor, Beyond Legal Orientalism, in ASIAN LAWS 
THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES, 47 (1997); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism,
101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 179-234 (2002) (regarding discussion on Chinese 
Law).
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that the idea that Confucian societies are without laws is wrong, 
but somehow sticks to the notion (created by Rodolfo Sacco and 
very popular among Italian comparative lawyers) that Eastern 
Asian countries are systems “without lawyers.”31 As a result, he 
claims that the importance of “traditional law,” although under 
the surface, is still extremely important. He adds that: “Even in 
sophisticated areas of the law, such as corporate governance, it 
seems possible to detect an alternative Japanese way, explainable 
only in terms of rule of traditional law.”32
Mattei’s theoretical framework is assisted by a sketchy 
graphical representation: in a triangle, the top left is “traditional 
law,” the bottom is “professional law” and the top right is 
“political law.” The proximity of a legal system to each of the 
corner is used to summarize the relative importance of each 
pattern. Japan is the closest system to the “traditional law” 
corner. 
Of course a simplistic graphic representation does not 
completely reflect the elaborate thought of Mattei. Nonetheless, 
as it may easily be seen, Japanese law in 1997 was visually 
depicted as being more traditional than Islamic or Hindu law.
This is a recurring pattern in general comparative law studies 
dealing with Japan. To overcome the above-mentioned problems 
of legal comparison (Euro-centrism, problems in comparing 
cultural frameworks, etc.), many scholars advocate a broader 
cultural understanding of the various experiences in the world, 
including Japan. Yet, the new approach is often based on old 
categories and therefore heavily relies on cultural stereotypes. 
To give another example: in 1998 Mark Van Hoecke and 
Mark Warrington proposed a move “towards a new model for 
comparative law.”33 The approach was again very enlightened, 
respectful of cultural diversity, strongly against the Euro-centric 
31. RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATOR 209-11
(5th ed. 2005) (It.).
32. Mattei, supra note 27, at 38. 
33. See generally Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal 
Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for 
Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q., 495-536 (1998).
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approach so often found in comparative law handbooks. 
Nonetheless, dealing with Japan, Van Hoecke and Warrington 
stumbled into the well-known stereotype about the reluctance to 
litigate, so we read: “Conflicts are preferably not brought to the 
court but solved through reconciliation. If there is a trial, each 
party has to make reciprocal concessions, so that it can, 
eventually, be terminated amicably.”34 This conclusion comes 
with no surprise: the sources of Japanese law scholarship in that 
(for other aspects remarkable indeed) article are relatively old 
writings by Noda (1971) and Oki (1985), and the importance of 
Noda for the “culturalist” approach has already been remarked.
This approach kept on going in the 2000s. As already noted 
by Veronica Taylor,35 in one of the most famous and widely 
commented and appreciated books on comparative law in the last 
decade36 from one side there is surprise for the fact that Japanese 
law studies are put outside comparative law studies in general; 
yet, from the other side, Japan is still referred to as one of the 
“extraordinary places.”
The good intention to introduce some cultural understanding
of different legal traditions still produces results that could sound 
at least a bit candid. In an article underlining the importance of 
comparative law education in universities37 (with which I fully 
concur), in a passage dealing with the Chinese legal system (but 
it is fair to extend the reasoning to all post-Confucian societies, 
like Japan), we read:
And you must understand the impact in China still from 
traditional Chinese thinking. The Chinese like poetry and 
calligraphy and painting and money - basically they do like 
34. Id. at 506.
35. Veronica L. Taylor, Asian Law Takes a Japanese Turn, Nagoya 
University, http://www.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/cale2001/result/reports/asia_ac/
2003/part1_sinpo2.html (last visited February 15, 2014).
36. COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS,
(Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds.) (2003).
37. See generally Ditlev Tamm, From a European to a Global 
Approach: Reflections on the Position of Comparative Law in Legal Education,
8 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 56, 56-65 (2011).
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these activities better than law and lawyers. I think that is still 
true even if on the surface it may appear different.38
I would say it is impossible to disagree with this opinion. 
However, I would be curious to know whether anybody in the
world would prefer law (and lawyers!) to art and money.39
It would be easy if we could just dismiss all the above as 
inaccurate or shallow scholarship. But it is not possible. Some of 
the authors mentioned here are among the best active 
comparative lawyers, and their intellectual qualities are beyond 
question.
III. JAPAN AS A VICTIM: BUT WHO IS GUILTY?
So we are left with a victim, Japan. Now it is time to find who 
is guilty. Of course, as the title of this paper says, it is 
comparative lawyers, but they have “accomplices.”
I would identify three additional categories of culprits: 
Japanese scholars of the past, Japanese scholars of the present 
and foreign scholars of Japanese law.
As for the first category: one of the reasons behind the deep 
and widespread influence of the cultural stereotype about 
Japanese law is the fact that, for a very long time, there was just 
a handful of texts on the subject accessible to the general public. 
The fact that Kawashima and Noda had such a deep impact on 
comparative law studies on Japan came about because their 
writings were among the few written in Western languages 
(English and French). Being Japanese, they were believed to 
have provided a true and objective expression of a “collective 
thought” about law in Japan. Only a few times in the history of 
comparative law has such a restricted number of individuals had 
such a deep impact on the general scholarship.
Moreover, it is a fair assumption to believe that both Noda 
and Kawashima were interested in conveying an easy-to-
understand and strong image of Japanese law, claiming a 
38. Id. at 64.
39. Lawyers are a possible exception.
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fundamentally different or “unique” legal mentality in Japan 
(compared to Western countries). It was not the first time in the 
relatively short history of Japanese modern legal studies that 
somebody had the primary purpose of demonstrating that Japan 
is different. One of the first studies on Japanese law available in 
English, a short book on the traditional features of Japanese 
family and inheritance law still in force after the 1898 Civil 
code, is opened by words stressing the difference (or maybe 
superiority?) of Japan compared to the Western world: “In 
Europe and America, Ancestor-Worship has long since ceased to 
exist, even if it was ever practiced.” 40 I am not necessarily 
claiming that scholars such as Noda and Kawashima were some 
kind of promoter of nihonjinron concepts in law: still, the 
importance of underlining the difference of the Japanese legal 
culture might have led to some over simplistic or even 
“promotional” depictions.
As for the second category: although in Japan comparative 
law per se is rarely taught in universities, Japanese legal scholars 
are probably the best comparative lawyers in the world. Due to 
the 150 year old tradition of studying foreign legal models, 
almost every Japanese law professor reads (and very often 
speaks fluently) at least one, but often more than one foreign 
language among German, English and French, and has a deep 
knowledge of a foreign jurisdiction among the most 
“prestigious”: France, Germany, England or the US. Also, it is 
remarkable how Japan is active in studying external models 
when it comes to update its legislation: I am not aware of any 
other highly developed country so willing to model a new law 
based on some foreign experience. The open-mindedness of the 
Japanese legislator is almost surprising. 41 There are however, 
two main issues: first, the study of foreign law and the study of 
comparative law are separate (albeit related) legal disciplines in 
40. NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW 1
(1901).
41. In a few occasions Japanese legislative advisors even ventured to 
Italy. For example, the saiban’in seido system is mainly modeled after the 
Italian (and French) experience.
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terms of theoretical framework. Second (and more important), 
the comparative activity carried on by Japanese scholars is 
mostly directed inwards: there are more writings in Japanese on 
foreign legal systems than comparative essays in languages 
accessible to the non-Japanese public.42 This leads comparative 
lawyers other that Japanese law specialists to often rely on 
derivate sources, replicating the pattern discussed before.
Lastly, the small club of Japanese law scholars tend to discuss 
among each other, excluding comparative lawyers. As pointed 
out by Mattei as an outsider43 and by Upham as an insider,44
experts of Japanese law are a quite closed group, and they 
mainly dialogue with colleagues from Japanese studies. It is 
mostly in the field of micro-comparison that Japanese law 
scholars are able to establish a structured and fruitful cooperation 
with other lawyers (and law professionals). There are many 
successful examples of this synergy,45 which, however, has not 
expanded to endow general comparative law with its benefits.
Japanese law scholars are also somehow perceived as exotic, 
if not quirky. 46 When they are invited to conferences dealing 
42. See also Andrea Ortolani, Japanese Comparative Law and Foreign 
Influences: a Preliminary Analysis CENTRO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E 
TRANSNAZIONALE, available at http://www.cdct.it/Pubblicazioni.aspx.
43. Mattei, supra note 27, at 8. (stating “[f]or instance, sinologists and 
Japanese law scholars discuss among themselves, rather than participate in the 
general enterprise of understanding law in a comparative perspective. I believe 
that such a marginalization has too high a cost for the comparative law 
community”).
44. Upham, supra note 5, at 640 (1997) (stating that Japanese law 
scholars “more frequently consider themselves close colleagues of other 
American scholars of Japan than of other American scholars of foreign law, 
and even within the law school world are more likely to associate intellectually 
with colleagues working on areas of common interest in domestic law such as 
corporations or legal sociology rather with colleagues specializing in, e.g.,
French or German law”).
45. See generally Dan Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness: 
Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 195 (2008) (examining corporate law from the perspective 
of practicing corporate law attorneys).
46. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS 
IN SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICS vii (2001) (“Each of us teaches an 
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with general comparative law problems they are somehow 
expected to claim that Japan is different, unique, special.47 When 
they do not, they face disappointment if not disbelief.48
IV. PERSPECTIVES FOR A CHANGE
The situation depicted so far is not very promising. However, 
moving from this point I still think that Japanese law studies can 
perform an important role in comparative law in general.
As mentioned before, Japan is also one of the best countries 
in the world to observe comparative law in action and to see how 
competing models could help to shape a distinct legal system. 
But Japan has been widely studied as an “importer” of foreigner 
legal institutions and much less as an “exporter.”49 Now Japan is 
extremely active in being the model for developing countries in 
Southeastern Asia and in the former Soviet Union area when it 
comes to designing their new legal institutions.50 Japanese law 
scholars are well equipped to investigate this phenomenon, 
which is extremely fascinating for comparative lawyers in 
general.
introductory course on Japanese law – indeed, collectively we have taught it 
almost three dozen times. We teach it for a simple reason: we find it fun. Why 
else, after all?”) But I think it is a fair assumption to believe that a cultural 
fascination is, to some extent, behind most comparative law research.
47. Taylor, supra note 35, at 5.
48. Upham, supra note 5, at 639 (demonstrating that when using Japan 
to study the civil law model, one needs to look beyond the law to the culture 
behind it).
49. When it was studied as an importer, mostly in historical perspective 
with regard to South Korea, the short Republican experience in mainland China 
and Taiwan.
50. Nagoya University, for example, has a center, CALE (Center of 
Asian Legal Exchange) specifically devoted to this activity and has also 
established a wide network of representative offices in universities in 
Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Uzbekistan and Vietnam to provide 
legal education by teaching Japanese law to local students and public servants 
(including judges, prosecutors, etc.). The activities of CALE are also mentioned 
in Zentaro Ktagawa, Development of Comparative Law in East Asia, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 238-260 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
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Japanese law specialists also have another important task, a 
deeply debated theme in contemporary comparative law is the 
issue of “Asian Values.” As is well known, this notion originally 
emerged in Malaysia and Singapore to assert the existence in 
East Asia of a common cultural and institutional framework and 
to claim that Western constitutionalism, essentially based on 
individual rights, was unfit for societies with a long tradition of 
collectivism.51 However, the debate sparked by this concept has 
since mutated and expanded, and while public law issues related 
to this theory have been well explored, now the new frontier is to 
be found in private and commercial law. There are ongoing
studies to find or create a common basis of contractual or 
commercial practices fit for East Asia.52 While I believe that 
these research endeavors are scientifically worthwhile, I think 
that Japanese law scholars could be perfect watchdogs to ensure 
that the exploration is carried out with methodological 
scrupulousness without indulging in political rhetoric. After 
decades of exposure to claims about giri and QLQMǀ they should 
have learned how to fight ideological assertions.53
After all, experts of Japanese law (and Japanese experts of 
comparative law) are not in a bad position to leave a mark in 
comparative law. Apologizing in advance for any eventual 
omission, I count five experts of Japanese law in executive 
positions (either Committee members or Sponsor Members’ 
delegates) in the American Society of Comparative Law; the 
Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé, the most important 
association of comparative law worldwide, has no less than 
51. Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate 
In Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 311 (1999-2000). 
52. For an example of the research financed by the JSPS under the 
“Asian Core Program” in 2007, see Tsuneo Matsumoto, The Reception and 
Creation of Law in East Asia: Towards the Formation of the Basis for an East 
Asian Ius Commune, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi (2007) available at
http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-acore/projects_completed.html (last visited 
February 15, 2014). 
53. Teemu Ruskola, Where is Asia? When Is Asia? Theorizing 
Comparative Law and International Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879 (2010-
2011) (describing how to identify “Asia” for the purpose of legal research). 
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seven members whose main or significant research interest is 
Japanese law, to which eighteen Japanese national members 
should be added. In the last conference of the Académie (Taipei, 
2012) and in the forthcoming (Wien, 2014), Japan will have two 
General Reports: a privilege granted only to those countries that 
contribute greatly to comparative law studies.
The study of Japanese law is increasingly popular in Europe. 
Germany has a long tradition of Japanese law studies, but 
experts and university classes on the subject are appearing in 
France, the UK, Spain, and Italy.
This relatively small but highly motivated patrol may finally 
build a bridge between Japanese law studies and general 
comparative law. Japan is no longer a far, exotic, mysterious 
country. Although a command of the Japanese language is 
necessary for those intending to carry out serious research on 
Japanese law, it is not difficult to access information about 
Japanese law written in Western languages.54 What is needed is a 
way to apply the rigorous tools of comparative law to rebuild the 
general view about Japan. Scholars in the 1960s and 1970s were 
somehow justified in relying so heavily on Kawashima (although 
Henderson – and to a certain extent even Wigmore before him -
had already shown that a different approach to Japanese law was 
possible)55 but now there are no excuses. Now the problem is 
quite the opposite: comparative law needs to deal with an 
information overload on Japan,56 and the challenge is to re-adjust 
the fundamental perception on the Japanese legal system, so that 
this flow of notions is properly funneled and is not 
instrumentally used to demonstrate Japan’s “cultural 
uniqueness.”
54. See generally Introduction, GROUP FOR THE LAW CONCERNING INT’L
SALES OF GOODS AND INT’L SERVS. CONTRACTS, http://www.law.tohoku.ac.jp/
kokusaiB2C/introduction/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
55. See generally DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND 
JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN, Vol. II (1965).
56. Annalise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the 
Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L. L. J., 1, 221 (1999). 
752 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
In my effort to fight stereotypes I may have been too direct. 
But, as Bruce Aronson has said, it is time to consider Japan “as a 
normal country.”
I am not claiming that “culture” is not important to 
understanding Japan. To the contrary, I have the utmost respect 
for a deep understanding of Japanese thought, society and 
history, and I think those elements are fundamental to truly 
understanding the legal system. It is exactly because culture is so 
important that it must be dealt with seriously: stereotypes are 
handy, easy to explain and to understand . . . and invariably 
wrong. That is why Japanese law scholars should also be the 
connection between comparative lawyers and other social 
scientists. Since it is too much to ask a lawyer to have a sound 
preparation in Japanese studies, a rigorous approach to cultural 
issues could be achieved by establishing a closer cooperation 
with anthropologists57 and sociologists strictu sensu.
Other disciplines could help the Japanese law scholar to 
overcome sketchy depictions (such as the economic approach 
used by Ramseyer – and Nakazato - 58 did, maybe even 
excessively and falling into another over-simplification). 59 In 
some remarkable essays, Ginsburg and Hoetker have tried to 
explain the sharp increase in litigation in Japan also by 
57. I am presently conducting research on the correlation between lease 
contracts and death. In Japan, if a previous tenant died in an apartment and the 
landlord fails to disclose the information, the tenant is entitled to unilaterally 
cancel the lease contract. The explanation, I am taught by my anthropologist 
colleagues, is that death makes the place “impure” and therefore defective, 
even from a legal point of view. Somebody could refer to this problem just as 
another strangeness of the Japanese. But even in the United States the debate
about the “psychologically impacted houses” is still very vivid and often the 
approach to the problem is not very different than Japan. See generally Raffaele 
Caterina, Storie di locazioni e di fantasmi, (Rubbettino Soveria Mannelli ed.) 
2011 (It.).
58. See generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational 
Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
263 (1989).
59. See Dan Puchniak. A Skeptic’s Guide to MIWA and Ramseyer’s 
‘The Fable of the Keirestsu’, 12 J. JAPANESE L. 273 (2007) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257913.
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employing purely economic factors. 60 The use of refined 
econometric tools could also help us to determine whether the 
litigation rate is directly correlated to economic conjunction even 
in the country of “context-based rationality”61 towards dispute 
resolution.62
One final note and wish: as I mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, scholars with a Continental background and 
researchers with a Common law legal education see different 
aspects of Japanese law. Some comparative joint research on 
Japan carried out by civil and common lawyers could help both 
to dismiss the respective lenses and produce some innovative 
results.63
Stevens wrote: “The study of Japanese law can lend much 
greater perspective to the narrow European or European-derived 
focus of the typical legal comparativist.”64 That was as early as 
1971. I believe this is still true today.
60. See generally Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant 
Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, Ill. L. & Econ. 
Working Papers Series (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=608582; see also Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The 
Effects Of Liberalization On Litigation: Notes Toward A Theory In The Context 
Of Japan, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 303 (2009). 
61. This very witty definition was created by Daniel Foote to 
summarize in a short and captivating expression the 50 years long debate about 
the Japanese approach to litigation.
62. In 2011 – 2012 as JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow at Ritsumeikan 
University I conducted a research on ADR in Japan. Part of my research 
consisted in a questionnaire submitted to law students, the first question of 
which was “how do you explain the recent increase in litigation in Japan?,” The 
most popular answer was that the increase is due to the economic downturn 
(220 out of 504 interviewees, 43,6%).
63. There are already many good examples of how good this 
cooperation could be. See generally JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL 
SYSTEM (Harald Baum ed., 1996) (demonstrating how beneficial cooperation 
can be). 
64. Charles R. Stevens, Modern Japanese Law as an Instrument of 
Comparison, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 665, 669 (1971).
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
